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RAWLS IN TORT THEORY:
THEMES AND COUNTER-THEMES
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
INTRODUCTION

Several themes in Rawls's moral and political philosophy have
inspired variations in the philosophical theory of tort law:
A) The Ex Ante Choice Situation and the Maximin Rule: the idea
that a fair order is one that would be selected by a rational person ex
ante,' and that such2 a person would seek to maximize the well-being
of the least well off;
B) Kantian constructivism:
the development of a nonmetaphysical constructivism as an approach to fundamental questions
about a defensible political order;3
C) Reflective Equilibrium: the idea of the independence of moral
theory, and more generally, a coherentist approach to the analysis of
important moral questions and concepts, as opposed to a
foundationalist or reductionistic approach;4
D) Reasonableness versus rationality: As the concept of practical
reason takes on a guiding role within normative theorizing, and as
decision theory based on a roughly economic conception of rationality
takes a dominant position within normative theories of practical
reason, Rawls's counterposing of reasonableness as a distinctive
normative ideal within practical reason is centrally important in moral
and political theory;5 and
E) Justice as the first virtue of social institutions: the postpositivistic and post-Enlightenment re-awakening of the ideal of
justice as an aspiration for political and legal institutions.6
This Essay will begin by explaining, in general terms, why each of
Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 4, at 15-19 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. Id. at 133 & n.19.
3. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980), reprinted in John
Rawls: Collected Papers 303-58 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
4. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 9, at 42-46; see also John Rawls,
The Independence of Moral Theory (1975), reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers
286-302 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
5. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 48-66 (1993); cf W.M. Sibley, The
Rational Versus the Reasonable, 62 Phil. Rev. 554 (1953).
6. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 11, at 47.
*
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these ideas has been important to the development of tort theory.
Part II, however, turns to counter-themes: reasons to be cautious in
carrying the Rawlsian themes to torts, at least in the manner that
leading philosophers of tort law have typically done.
I. RAWLSIAN THEMES IN TORT THEORY

A. Evaluation of Policy in Terms of Ex Ante Analysis and the
Maximin Rule
From the original position, from behind the veil of ignorance, an
aggregative social welfare function would not be selected.7 Rather,
special emphasis would be given to avoiding very bad outcomes.
Offsetting good consequences would not suffice to render a structure
with improvable bad outcomes more acceptable than a structure that
improved the bad outcomes. This would be true so long as one
abstracted from one's actual situation.
The general point here is not just the difference principle.8 Indeed,
the difference principle is one of the conclusions detached from this
basic argument form. The form of argument is to depict the
legitimacy of a structure of rules as stemming from its agreeability to
all those who would be bound by it. Of course, this is a decisiontheoretic revision of the basic social contract question. In no small
measure, the ability to generate this question was an extremely
valuable contribution to social contract theory. And the answer
Rawls gave was that average utilitarianism would not be agreed to.9
Rather, a different social welfare function would be selected. A
broader point here is that a value theory that in form looked like
utilitarianism would not necessarily have as little room for concepts of
fairness as Utilitarians once argued; a generally welfarist framework is
non-committal on questions of distribution, and a maximin principle is
argued for.1°
Gregory Keating shows that a concept of fairness of the sort utilized
in A Theory of Justice, and of the sort that generates the difference
principle, offers a distinctive way of viewing an important set of issues
in tort law." The question is whether injuries caused by non-negligent
conduct should generate liability in the party who caused them.
Keating's answer is that if the party who caused an accident is an
enterprise that engages in an activity, and the accident is characteristic
7. Id. § 30, at 160-68.
8. Id. § 13, at 65-70.
9. Id. § 30, at 144-53.
10. Id. § 26, at 130-39.
11. See Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of
Accidents, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1857, 1880-81 (2004) [hereinafter Keating, Fairness];
see also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
Stan. L. Rev. 311, 317 (1996) [hereinafter Keating, Reasonableness].
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of the activity, then the entity should be held liable.12 And that is
because it is a random matter who (among those possibly injured)
turns out to suffer an accidental injury. And yet such an accident is a
huge blow. And so the question is essentially whether it is fair to
require the individual unluckily struck with this injury to suffer the
entire burden of it, or whether fairness would require a legal system
that spreads the cost among all of those who benefited from the
imposition of the risk. Drawing upon a Rawlsian notion of fairness,
Keating argues that the cost should be spread. 3 Even if such a costspreading system would be less efficient, it would be fairer and thus,
all-considered, superior. To permit the accident to go uncompensated
for the sake of other savings in the system is to fail to recognize the
separateness of persons. The deprivation of the plaintiff herself is not
really offset by the efficiency enjoyed by other parties. A welfarist
approach would attend to the distribution of the enormous loss of
utility. Keating rightly points to Fletcher and Fried as ancestors of his
Rawlsian view.'4
B. Kantian Constructivism
A second aspect of Rawls is his revitalization of a non-reductive
rights-based conceptual framework-opposed to a utilitarian one-for
thinking about issues in moral and political philosophy. 5 A great deal
of extant Rawlsian theorizing in law is of course about rights, for just
this reason. Rawls is to be credited with elucidating in twentiethcentury, non-transcendentalist garb the Kantian principle that the
right is prior to the good. Relatedly, he developed a constructivist
account of rights and duties in the domain of political morality, now
freed from the natural rights and mythical stage-setting of Locke. 6
The key to both of these moves is a depiction of the normative force
of principles of political right lying entirely within the domain of a
pattern of reasons that appeal to reasonable people under conditions
approximatingour own, and aspiringto a regulative ideal.'7
The language of A Theory of Justice and PoliticalLiberalism speaks
of constitutional essentials, s and of course we naturally began our
conference with this meeting place of Rawls and the law. Rawls
himself displayed great depth and sensitivity in analyzing what it
means for certain patterns of reasons and justifications to be realized
12. See generally Keating, Fairness,supra note 11.
13. Id. at 1885-86.
14. Id. at 1858 n.4 (citing George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972)); Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values 183-206 (1970)).
15. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 6, at 27-29; see also Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 5, at 294-99.
16. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 18, at 96-98.
17. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 187-90.
18. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 31, at 171-76; Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 5, at 227-30.
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in institutional form. We are doubly lucky, in constitutional law,
because Dworkin and others have also developed Kantian themes of
right and played out their institutionalization with great subtlety and
power.' 9
Arthur Ripstein derives from Rawls a Kantian constructivist
methodology, and a deontic normative structure, and argues that such
an approach elucidates fundamental truths in tort law. 0 His basic
idea, like both Kant's and Rawls's, is that certain normative principles
provide persons with a sort of normative boundary for the pursuit of a
life that is in accordance with their conception of the good. Strikingly,
Ripstein asserts that principles of tort law play a substantial role in
forming this boundary. Like Keating, he argues that tort law is
needed for the protection of security interests that are a primary good.
He also argues that liberty is unduly compromised if the scheme of
rights and duties imposes liability for acts that are not wrongful. But
Ripstein has a more philosophically ambitious approach.
We
construct, within the private law of torts, a notion of who is
responsible for which losses. Part of having a domain of equal
freedom that respects security and liberty, is having a domain within
which one's capacity to conform one's conduct to norms of
reasonableness succeeds in preserving, to the extent possible, one's
holdings and one's bodily integrity. To put it differently, while one
cannot, of course, count on security as against all misfortune, one can
count on: not being held responsible for what is not one's own doing;
being held responsible for what is a realization of one's own failure to
comply with norms of reciprocal care; and having a claim against
those who are responsible for those of one's own losses that flow from
others' conduct in violation of norms of reciprocal care.
C. Reflective Equilibrium
A third aspect of Rawls's work that is relevant to tort theory is quite
independent of the substantive theory of justice he provides and of the
contractarian approach that he defends. I refer to Rawls's work in
moral epistemology.
While one aspect of Rawls's reflective
equilibrium is methodological, and a related aspect is contractarian,
there is a third and equally important aspect that is at root
epistemological. There is a strand of thinking most clearly set forth in
The Independence of Moral Theory,2 most famously represented by
the passages on reflective equilibrium in A Theory of Justice,22 and

19. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
20. Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 1811, 1825 (2004).
21. Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, supra note 4, at 286-302.
22. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 5, at 18-19, § 9, at 42-45, § 21, at
104, § 65, at 379, § 66, at 381.
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found in numerous subsequent works of Rawls2 3 and Rawlsians, most
particularly Thomas Scanlon. 24 This is, very broadly speaking, an antifoundationalism or coherentism in moral thinking. 25 The point is that
the enterprise of analyzing moral concepts and principles does not
depend for its legitimacy on the capacity to produce a set of moral
primitive concepts that are epistemically basic and transparent. 26 It is,
of course, painting with an extremely broad brush to depict Rawls as
the great American post-Emotivist in analytical moral philosophy, but
I think it is a representation nevertheless worth making. And from
this remove, I think we may say that part of the power of Rawls as a
coherentist moral epistemologist is that the project within substantive
moral and political philosophy that he undertook was as impressive,
credible, and substantial as it was.
The reason that I turn to moral epistemology is because knee-jerk
skepticism in moral epistemology has an enormously important role in
the history of American legal thought, and it is nowhere better
exemplified than in tort theory. For tort law abounds with moral
notions, broader, and more deeply nested in our culture than those in
contracts, crimes, or even constitutional law. The vocabulary of duty,
dignity, prudence, care, negligence, obligation-this vocabulary in tort
is unfathomably rich. As John Goldberg and I have argued in a
number of places, the intellectual history of the dominant trend of
American tort theory grows out of Holmes's brash and unapologetic
skepticism about concepts of duty and right. 27 Both treatise-writers,
like William Prosser, and high theorists, like Richard Posner,
developed into reductive instrumentalists about moralistic vocabulary
of tort law,2 8 at least partly because of a philosophical sentiment that
this was the intellectually responsible way to handle moral concepts.
In an era of moral philosophy dominated by Rawlsian coherentism,
tort theory has begun to take on a different complexion. We are now
beginning to ask whether "Duty" really does mean something, and if
so, what: whether concepts of reasonableness in tort really reduce to
economic rationality; whether the concept of a special relationship
generating a duty of care is merely shorthand for the idea that liability
within certain pockets would be efficacious, or whether it really means
what it says; and so on for a variety of concerns relating to reputation,
23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 8 & n.8; John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement 26-32 (2001).
24. See T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism and
Beyond 103 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
25. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L. Rev. 1679 (1997).
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 285-88.
27. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
Macpherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733, 1762-64 (1998); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence
Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 657, 693-94 (2001).
28. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1953).
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bodily integrity, dignity, deception, and a variety of other interests and
obligations.
D. Reasonableness Versus Rationality
Political Liberalism relies
upon a distinction between
reasonableness and rationality. 29
"Rationality" denotes what is
sometimes referred to as "economic rationality."
This involves
engaging in means-end reasoning that pursues preferences in the
manner most conducive to their attainment.3" To put it differently, it
involves acting in a manner that is consistent with one's set of beliefs
and desires.
Rationality may also involve a game-theoretic
component.
Reasonableness, like rationality, is meant to denote an excellence in
practical reasoning.3 1 Unlike rationality, however, reasonableness
involves the attribute of constraining the pursuit of one's desires so as
to accommodate the pursuits, goals, and desires of other persons. The
reasonable person recognizes that others similarly have demands, and,
given the potential for competing claims, the reasonable person
recognizes the appropriateness of acceding, to some degree. In
PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls puts forward the two principles of justice
32
as principles that would be selected by the reasonable person.
Among the many offerings of that work is its depiction of
reasonableness as distinct from rationality, its claim that
reasonableness is an excellence of practical reasoning, and its claim
that reasonableness of persons in certain contexts yields certain
courses of conduct.33
Keating offers a detailed argument that the concept of the average
"reasonable person" within English and American negligence law
should be understood in terms of Rawlsian reasonableness, not in
terms of Posner's economic rationality.34 Similarly, Ripstein places a
Rawlsian reconstruction of the reasonable person at the center of his
tort theory. To understand the significance of these positions, it is
important to bear in mind that Posner's famous 1972 article, A Theory
of Negligence,36 argued that reasonableness in negligence law was
economic rationality, and he famously illustrated his thesis with Judge
37
Learned Hand's decision in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
Posner's article was enormously influential. Indeed, while Coase's
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 48 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 48 nn.1-2.
See Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 11, at 382-84.
Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility and the Law 6-9 (1999).
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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The Problem of Social Cost38 and Calabresi's The Cost of Accidents39
were earlier, among torts professors, Posner's retelling of negligence
doctrine in terms of the Hand formula has been dominant. There are
many reasons for its success, and many reasons for its equation of
reasonableness with economic rationality-which in some ways drew
from earlier tort scholars."n But it is likely that both Posner and the
judges and scholars who preceded him were drawn to their analysis by
the absence of plausible alternatives and by the general attraction of
American legal thinkers since Holmes to utilitarian thinking. To the
extent that Rawls's prominent reconstruction of the idea of
reasonableness presented an alternative, that itself has been important
to tort theory.
Keating and Ripstein, in somewhat different ways, draw much more
substantial theoretical value out of the Rawlsian analysis of
reasonableness. Keating's central point is that the balancing among
interests in bodily security, freedom of activity, and costs of
precautions, does not proceed in a Posnerian manner at all.4 ' Rather,
a reasonable person with an awareness of the importance of
reciprocity will recognize the primacy of security interests, and will
constrain his or her activity in a manner that prioritizes security
interests. In effect, this means that economic costs and constraint of
activity, even if applied to large numbers of people, will not outweigh
security interests for the reasonable person. Thus, for example, a
critically important safety device for a car is something a reasonable
person would not forego, even if it predictably will be critically
important for a small number of people, and its cost will be felt by
millions.
Ripstein shares Keating's view that reasonableness involves a
higher level of attentiveness to the non-sacrificeability of security
interests.42 His principal claim (and, indeed, the source of his
argument for the latter) regarding the concept of the reasonable
person is that this concept is, importantly, objective and value-laden,
not subjective and preference-generated, as the Bayesian would have
it. Built into the Rawlsian notion of reasonableness is an idea of
equality and reciprocity, and this idea precludes the subjectivism of
the Bayesian.
A Bayesian will demand that the modicum of
precautions required is a function of the preferences of others. The
Rawlsian reasonable person tailors his or her conduct to the wellbeing of others, not to their preferences per se. Thus, if someone has
38. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
39. Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis
(1970).
40. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 813, 831-42 (2001)
(tracing scholarship that preceded Carroll Towing on balancing).
41. See Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 11, at 329-32, 337-41.
42. See Ripstein, supra note 35, at 116.
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idiosyncratic preferences, the reasonable person need not
accommodate him.
Conversely, however, the ground of the
requirement of reasonable care relates to others' rights to primary
goods, not to their preferences.
E. The Primacy of Justice

Finally, and in many ways most obviously, I come to the topic of
justice itself. To some extent my initial remarks about the topic of
justice are merely a summary of the prior comments. Theorizing of
American tort law, more than any other area of the law, underwent a
transformation in the twentieth century.43 Just as its concepts were
reconceived instrumentally, so its very point was conceived of in an
entirely utilitarian manner. Yet on its face, this is not what tort law is
about. On its face, tort law is about doing justice. A natural retort is
that tort law is about accidents, and accidents do not call for a justiceseeking system so much as a system for deterrence and
compensation.' There is something to this response, but ultimately it
strikes me as driving the point home. For tort law did not used to be
about accidents, and it is not defined that way historically, or even by
today's courts and treatises. It is about wrongs, not accidents. And
yet the wrongs-based framework so plainly calls out for a justicebased conception that we have literally tried to change the subject.
By providing contemporary, hard-headed thinkers with a theory
that really is a theory of justice, Rawls re-awakened hope that tort
theory would take seriously the normative notion that would seem,
somehow, to be built into it. We need not be afraid of justice as
something to talk about, think about, and aim for. And of course, that
is what numerous contemporary philosophers of tort law, such as
Coleman,

5

Weinrib,4 6 Perry,47 and Ripstein s have undertaken.

Indeed, the philosophical analysis of tort law is referred to by legal
scholars generally, today, as "corrective justice theory," indicating
now a central place for justice in legal theory, particularly in torts. It
is no exaggeration to say that prior to Rawls's theory of justice, no one
considered defining their theoretical aspirations in tort law in any way
but in terms of the social ends of tort law. Rawls's assertion that
"[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions" 49 -backed up by a
non-metaphysical and rigorous theory of justice-is undeniably a
43. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History
(expanded ed. 2003).
44. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 39 (rethinking tort law in terms of reducing accident
costs and compensation costs).
45. Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992).
46. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995).
47. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449
(1992).
48. Ripstein, supra note 35.
49. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, §1, at 3.
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large part of the intellectual history behind the transformation that
occurred, wherein scholars have now returned to the idea that
theorists of tort law should ask the question: What does this area of
the law have to do with justice?
II. RAWLSIAN COUNTER-THEMES IN TORT THEORY

I now want to revisit each of these points for the purpose of
sounding a cautionary note. In fact, I will suggest that each of these
ideas tends to point toward a set of possible concerns about
misapplication, and often conflict among, these Rawlsian ideas. This
is not meant to undercut the significance of these Rawlsian ideas, but
merely to indicate that they point toward quite a rich and nuanced
area of theoretical inquiry, one in which scholars can easily slip.
A. Maximin and Ex Ante Analysis
It is easy to confuse Rawls's deontological framework for thinking
about the two principles of justice with certain aspects of his ex ante
analysis of political arrangements. Hence, for example, it is tempting
to say that it does not matter whether a certain liability scheme will, in
total, expend a fairly high level of resources by utilizing a lot of time in
the courts, because this is a mere financial cost, whereas the right not
to be interfered with in a manner that cuts into the security of primary
goods is a fundamental political right. In Rawls's work, this kind of
idea is expressed by saying that primary goods are lexically ordered
above the difference principle, and that the two principles of justice
are built into the constitutional essentials in a manner that is not made
available for legislative compromise. 0 In Dworkin's work, it is made
available in the idea that rights are trumps. 1 In this vein, one might
think that Keating would respond to an argument that enterprise
liability is too expensive by arguing that because this is a deontic
rather than a utilitarian framework, cost cannot defeat this point of
fairness.
I think that one form of this move may be viable but one is not.
Perhaps it is cogent to argue that the chance to make the point about
cost was in the ex ante analysis to begin with, and that once the
enterprise liability is decided upon as demanded in the ex ante
analysis, the time is over to make it. I am not sure about that.
Perhaps Keating's ex ante analysis provides an argument about what
fairness requires, but leaves open the question of whether the
requirements of fairness are the only consideration on the table in
deciding upon a tort system.
However, even if one argues that fairness should be an overriding
50. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 5, at 229-30; Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, supra note 1, § 31, at 174-75.
51. See Dworkin, supra note 19, at 82-130.
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criterion, it is still appropriate to put the costs of the system into the
ex ante analysis. Now it might appear that Keating has already
included it:
that when he focuses on the individual with the
uncompensated accident, he is focusing on the worst off. That person
is in a better situation in a society with, say, higher taxes and higher
costs of goods and services, but compensation in the case of
catastrophic accident occurring within an activity to which an
enterprise is attached. Leaving aside the question of whether Keating
has really dealt with that issue, what concerns me is that I do not think
that Keating can help himself to maximin as a general rule of choice
for tort liability rules. Maximin is not an analysis of what is fair in an
ex ante analysis. It is rather a decision-theoretic embodiment of
aspects of Rawls's Kantian framework, brought to the question of
what the basic principles should be for a political order. Thus, for
example, the question behind the veil of ignorance is not, in truth, a
question under probabilistic uncertainty. The question for liability
rules is such a question. To put the point differently, Keating is
vulnerable to the criticism that his chooser is simply incredibly riskaverse. But Rawls in A Theory of Justice is not,
because it is not
2
probability as such behind the veil of ignorance.
Now what one might argue, and what I think Ripstein believes, is
that this implies that it is illegitimate for Keating to use the framework
at all for torts. I think that this misses a large and legitimate aspect of
Rawls and Rawlsian work, which is arguably detachable, with care.
This is, as I said, the idea that ex ante analysis of liability rules ought
to be open-minded as to distributional questions, and that there are
reasons to be deeply suspicious that a pure aggregative function will
unjustifiably ignore considerations of fairness and equality, which
other social welfare functions might better respect. Where this leaves
me on enterprise liability is that I want to hear a lot more about how
much it will cost not only shareholders, but courts, and especially,
consumers. It seems to me that an average consumer of automobiles
might well prefer a system of first-person automobile insurance, and
either first-person or socialized health insurance, and then simply no
coverage for those perhaps quite significant costs that fall inbetween-no coverage at all, but cheaper automobiles and cheaper
automobile insurance. The unfairness of one person occasionally
suffering this is, I think, something a person might well choose to risk,
ex ante. However, I think that Keating is right that Rawls gives us the
vocabulary to think about the mitigation of the random distribution of
life's misfortunes as something an aggregative function does not
capture.
Rawls has indeed inspired an interesting domain of work in tort
theory that focuses on ex ante analysis and selections of putatively
52. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 26, at 134-35.
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egalitarian social welfare functions. Economists have actually been
more forthcoming and creative than philosophers in offering such
views, at least within tort theory.53 As I and others have offered, there
are reasons to be skeptical about the value of economic models as
interpretations of pieces of the law. 4 But from a practical point of
view, one may want to know whether certain changes in the structure
of tort law would be justifiable. To a significant extent, these are
questions for which one would want to know how the distribution of
welfare would be affected. And one would also want to know
whether the function against which one ought to be measuring welfare
changes and distribution ought to be purely aggregative, or ought to
be something else. Several contemporary analyses have advocated
alterations because they better comport with a Rawlsian/egalitarian
picture of distributive justice.
B. Kantian Constructivism
Let's turn to the Kantian constructivist possibility. I want to suggest
one point of concern about the general form of theory Ripstein is
offering. What makes it appealing to think that there is a Kantian
structure of reciprocity that somehow relates to primary goods is the
idea that norms of conduct-particularly involving permissible risk
levels-constitute an evenhanded framework for delimiting liberty in
light of the threat to security that a failure to delimit liberty would
entail.56 Yet if this is so, then tort law-insofar as it is depicted as an
embodiment of a constitutive feature of a political system-seems to
be about regulating behavior among private parties, i.e., primary rules
of conduct, primary duties, and primary rights.
Tort law, so
conceived, sets forth rules of conduct that would provide reciprocally
acceptable levels of liberty and security for persons whose activities

53. The most widely disseminated examination of liability rules from the point of
view of different social welfare functions is Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's
Fairness Versus Welfare. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare
(2002). Kaplow and Shavell's work curiously harks back to weak, quasi-emotivist
criticisms of a variety of moral concepts by which they purport to be mystified, or of
which they purport to have complete psychological reductions. But all the while, they
purport to concede that distributive questions cannot be answered in any obvious way
by an aggregative function, and therefore to leave distributive questions open. Id. at
24-28.
They then offer an interesting and controversial argument that any
divergences from an aggregative function should be handled by the tax system, and
that therefore there is no reason to use anything other than an aggregative utilitarian
analysis in selecting liability rules within the domain of tort. See id. at 33-38.
54. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, PragmaticConceptualism, 6 Legal Theory 457
(2000).
55. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of
Accidents: Pain-and-SufferingDamages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785 (1995)
(using a Rawlsian framework to argue for the worth of pain-and-suffering damages).
56. See Ripstein, supra note 20, at 1811.
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both display their freedom and risk the security of others. Tortious
conduct, so conceived, is conduct that crosses the line.
There is now a rich Kantian literature on tort law so conceived, and
Ripstein's contribution to this symposium pushes that literature yet
further; I do not have the space here to do it justice. And yet it still
seems to me that a fundamental problem remains with the
explanatory strategy, a problem that Stephen Perry has noted, both
here57 and elsewhere.58 The problem is that a great deal of what we
want in a tort theory goes beyond saying what forms of conduct will
be deemed to have crossed the line-will be deemed tortious. We
also need an account of why the legal system responds to tortious
conduct the way it does, by creating civil liability owed to a private
party. Criminal punishment or civil sanctions would seem equally
appropriate, in many cases-so far as the Rawls/Kant aspect of Perry's
view goes. Does the Rawlsian and Kantian picture of reciprocal
restraints on conduct tell us anything about why civil liability is the
right response?
A converse problem arises if one uses the Rawls/Kant framework,
in the first instance, to decide who, as a matter of fairness, should be
allocated which sorts of damages as liability. Both Fletcher and
Keating have tried this route.59 If fairness and reciprocity are used to
determine not which conduct is acceptable, but who should pay for
which losses as a matter of fairness, then we are at least addressing the
important questions of liability. But the problem just reappears, for
then we have little to say that is probative on what the primary rules
of conduct ought to be from a Rawlsian and Kantian point of view. In
short, a Rawlsian "fairness and reciprocity" analysis can be done at
the level of primary rules of conduct or at the level of liability, but it is
unclear how it could be done on both levels. But since tort law
involves both the concept of an obligation of conduct, and the concept
of liability for the failure to live up to that obligation, we want a
Rawlsian and Kantian analysis that hits at both levels.
Ripstein anticipates this dilemma, and aims to solve it by offering a
profound extension of a tenet of Rawls's Kantian constructivism to
tort law. The Kantian constructivist root is that part of what a state
does, qua state, in order to enable individuals to live lives in pursuit of
their own conception of the good life, is to define (constructively) the
raw materials out of which such a life is constructed; bodily integrity
and basic property are parts of what the state constructively protects.
Now, Ripstein's point is that, in the absence of tort law, both bodily
57. Stephen Perry, Ripstein, Rawls, and Responsibility, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1845
(2004).
58. Stephen R. Perry, The Distributive Turn: Mischief, Misfortune, and Tort Law,
in Analyzing Law 141-62 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
59. See Fletcher, supra note 14; Keating, Fairness,supra note 11, at 1863-64, 1870-
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integrity and physical property are not well-defined. The promise of a
scheme within which they can exist-a promise that is essential to
there being primary goods-is breached without rules that both
prohibit conduct that interferes with (or unduly risks interfering with)
these goods, and that permits redress for such interferences by
allocating responsibility for them.
I find the basic root of this argument quite plausible, both as an
interpretation of Kant's general argument for the necessity of private
law (for one can see how property and contract might follow), and as
a Rawlsian argument for the necessity of private law in general and
accident law in particular. But to say that there is a Rawlsian and
Kantian constructivist argument for the proposition that we need
some form of law like tort law is not to say that a Kantian or Rawlsian
framework is likely to be useful in illuminating the structure and
concepts of extant Anglo-American tort law. In particular, it is not
clear why this line of argument would be likely to thread the horns of
the dilemma posed above.
C. Coherentism in Moral Epistemology
Parts II.A. and II.B. respond with counter-themes to Parts I.A. and
I.B., aiming to temper the enthusiasm attached to those themes with
recognition of peculiar features of the tort scenario. The countertheme of this part contrasts with those insofar as its aim is to amplify
the importance of the moral epistemology theme for tort theory. On
the other hand, it arrives at the same place, again suggesting that
substantial portions of extant Rawlsian tort theory would benefit from
greater caution.
The match between tort theory and Rawls was made most strikingly
in George Fletcher's HarvardLaw Review article, Fairnessand Utility
in Tort Theory.6' While Fletcher utilized Rawls against utilitarians
and economists, and in particular against Posner's theory, in
another-and much more general-respect, his view resembled that
of the utilitarians. Fletcher was forwarding a grand theory of torts,
utilizing a paradigm of fairness (as opposed to utility). Grand
theorists in legal theory typically aspire to explain a great deal with a
modest number of concepts. There are many reasons within both
political and moral theory, and within the very enterprise of theory
construction, to attend to this sort of goal; "elegance," "simplicity,"
and "parsimony" are some of the terms of commendation we often
hear. Some grand theories-such as utilitarianism, for examplepurport to use building blocks that are not only few in kind (utilities,
probabilities), but also particularly simple and uncontroversial in their
nature. Thus, reductive instrumentalist utilitarianism or wealthmaximizing views have been a particularly prominent form of grand
60. Fletcher, supra note 14.
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theory. Fletcher's Rawlsian tort theory did not aim for this kind of
reductivism, even though it aimed for a kind of simplicity and
elegance.
Indeed, Rawls's own theory of justice is certainly
beautifully structured, elegant, and sweeping, and it is not reductive.
Nevertheless, I suggest that Rawls's coherentist methodology in
moral theory, including the method of reflective equilibrium, counsels
against certain kinds of grand theory in torts. What is important for
Rawls, especially in his article, The Independence of Moral Theory,61 is
what I would call the methodological primacy of the first-order, in
normative theorizing. Perhaps this is just a fancy way of saying that
Rawls was an anti-foundationalist in moral theory. But I think not.
Rawls argued ini The Independence of Moral Theory that it is a
mistake to think we should satisfy ourselves in moral epistemology
prior to engaging in our best attempts to describe the moral landscape
fully, as we see it.62 Perhaps this was, in part, because Rawls thought
we are likely to skew the moral landscape if we start with epistemic
precepts. Undoubtedly, Rawls was not particularly confident that
abstract moral epistemic demands, and philosophers' intuitions about
how these demands should be applied, would be more defensible than
the first-order normative claims themselves, a view that Dworkin has
made much of.63 And it seems Rawls believed (and argued by
example) that we might be in a better position to address thorny
epistemic questions after we had done more work at the first-order
level. But beyond all of these reasons, Rawls in a pragmatic,
Habermasian, and pragmatist way thought that in the end what we
really want is the development of a certain kind of ordering of our
convictions and judgments that can play a certain role in both an
internal and a public enterprise of normative construction.
Undoubtedly, there is a very nuanced epistemic and metaphysical
question about whether the fruits of reflective equilibrium constitute
moral knowledge, but-aside from the fact that Rawls and his
Quinean and post-Wittgensteinian colleagues actually had some very
interesting answers to those questions-Rawls maintained a
philosophically steady position that the reason-based activity of
seeking reflective equilibrium was a valid-and perhaps the bestway of conducting normative theorizing.'
It seems to me that these methodological ideas have importance in
the normative methodological theory of common law scholarship, and
here I shall focus on tort scholarship. Just as it is common for moral
thinkers to demand a persuasive moral epistemology or metaphysics
prior to a first-order moral theory, so it is common in tort scholarship
61. Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, supra note 4.
62. Id. at 286-91.
63. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 87-139 (1996).
64. See Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, supra note 4, at 288-91.

2004]

RAWLS IN TORT THEORY

1937

to demand a persuasive normative theory of the function or value of
tort law prior to engaging in first-order tort theorizing. An extension
of the Rawlsian point would be that there is value to exploring the
connections among the normative concepts and principles of tort law
and ascertaining how they fit together within the law. First, it is likely
to enhance our ability to render the law more coherent and
predictable, both of which are virtues of a legal system. Second, it is
likely to reveal, in an important sense, what the animating principles
of the law are. Third, it is likely to reveal the normative questions
about the validity of the law that we ought to be asking ourselves.
And finally, it is likely to clarify a number of epistemic questions
about the law.
The point is clearer, I think, when put in the negative. Do we need
to know what would justify the tort law, or what its fundamental
purpose is, before we describe its normative structure?
I am
suggesting that the answer is no; that, indeed, Rawls's antifoundationalist argument in favor of reflective equilibrium supports a
normative methodology not only of anti-reductionism, but also one
that eschews the priority of justification in the analysis of law. We
need not be Langdellians to appreciate Tony Sebok's point that there
is a sense in which legal theory better resembles the sciences of
zoology and botany than physics." Understanding the law means, in
part, grasping its complexity and its variety of parallel categories and
nested categories, and understanding how they all fit together. If this
is correct, then the moral language of tort law does not channel
thoughts into a category of fairness or responsibility, any more than
into utility or efficiency.
Rawls the coherentist moral epistemologist may be a better guide
for torts than Rawls the theorist of distributive justice or Rawls the
Kantian constructivist.
Happily, Keating and Ripstein-and
numerous other leading philosophers of law-have themselves
displayed great interest in tort doctrine, and are not guilty of
prioritizing abstract principle above the actual concepts of law, in their
interpretive theorizing. Yet, as Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow's
book6 6 indicates, the archetype of the philosopher of tort law is the
top-down Rawlsian fairness theorist. I believe that Rawls himself
would have rejected such a position.
D. Reasonableness and Rationality
The prior counter-theme telegraphs my concern about Rawlsian
theories of the reasonableness of the reasonable person standard in
tort law, but it will be useful to make it explicit. Although a Rawlsian
notion of reasonableness is more illuminating than a Bayesian notion
65. Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence 92-94 (1998).
66. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 53.
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of rationality in accounting for the reasonable person standard,
several cautionary points must be noted, in light of both the
complexity of tort doctrine, and the situatedness of tort law within an
institutional context:
A) Negligence law is only part of tort law, and the reasonable
person standard is not an explicit part of most other aspects of tort
doctrine; and it is not clear whether it is (at least prior to dogmatic
rewriting of parts of tort doctrine) really part of most other torts;
B) Theorizing about what standards of tort law would be a
reasonable accommodation of liberty and security in establishing the
contours of tort law is not the same as asking what a reasonable
person would do: The concept of reasonableness plays a part in the
legal theory of the former, and in the black letter law of the latter;
C) Reasonable care within negligence law is often phrased in terms
of "ordinary care" or the "average prudent person"; the latter two
concepts are quite distinct from a Rawlsian conception of
reasonableness;67
D) Particularly in the United States, where jury trials prevail in
negligence cases, the reasonable person standard gets its content in
substantial part from
its role in framing a jury consideration of
68
community norms;
E) In many categories of negligence cases, questions of negligence
are normally framed by "standards of care" extant in a subcommunity
(e.g., medical malpractice);69
F) While many negligence cases involve questions of appropriate
levels of advertent risk-taking, to which the "reasonableness" inquiry
has a certain connection, many other negligence cases (e.g., car
crashes) involve failures of execution, often inadvertent, to which the
reasonableness inquiry is not particularly clearly related.70
In light of these concerns (and doubtless others), there are reasons
to be skeptical on the question of how much work Rawlsian
reasonableness will do in tort theory.

67. Cf Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics
and Tort Law, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1431 (2000) (analyzing breach standard in terms
of virtue of prudence).
68. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 407, 424 (1999); cf. Catharine Pierce
Wells, Tort Law as CorrectiveJustice: A PragmaticJustificationfor Jury Adjudication,
88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348 (1990) (depicting aspects of tort law as structured to permit
juries to make justice-based decisions).
69. Cf Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpracticeand the Structure of Negligence
Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 649, 677-79 (1998) (noting that legal malpractice, like
medical malpractice, defines breach in terms of an extant standard in the legal
profession).
70. Id. at 688.
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E. Theories of Justice
Now let's turn again to the topic of justice. My concern here is that
Rawls's extraordinary analysis of distributive justice only crystallizes a
critical negative point in tort theory: Insofar as tort law is a concrete,
institutionalized effort to realize a form of justice, and insofar as
successful tort theory elucidates that form of justice, the form of
justice in question is not distributive justice. A wonderful literature
including Coleman, Weinrib, Ripstein, Perry, and others has, of
course, developed the Aristotelian idea of corrective justice,7 1 and has
explored its connections and perhaps tensions with distributive justice.
I would urge that the familiar Aristotelian contrast between corrective
justice and distributive justice may understate the fundamental
distance between the justice named in A Theory of Justice and the
justice we explore in trying to understand tort law. For tort law
appears to involve the idea of justice being done. Tort law is about
responses to certain kinds of conduct or mishaps or wrongs or
injuries.72 A theory of justice for this area would focus, in the first
instance, on what kinds of responses to these events there ought to be,
what kinds of responses would count as just responses. Rawls's theory
of justice treats justice as an attribute of a political and/or legal
system. Justice in tort is not about that.
Of course, there have been efforts to link the two.73 But it strikes
me that the openness, the candor, and the anti-reductivism of Rawls's
overall philosophical mindset and moral epistemology points us in
another direction-the direction of trying to understand the sense in
which a form of law is committed to a different kind of idea, a
different order of justice.
CONCLUSION

It is a mark of Rawls's greatness as a philosopher that in legal
theory, an area outside of his own, he is regarded as having caused a
massive shift in ways of thinking. George Fletcher's tort theory, like
Ronald Dworkin's constitutional theory, was important in part
because it imported our leading political philosopher's ideas into law,
and thereby changed the terms of debate. The Rawlsian frame shift in
legal theory, as in international human rights, virtue theory, and
numerous other areas where Rawls had not initially worked, is a
testament to the power of his ideas.
But here, too, there is a counter-theme. Although Rawls's theory
of justice will undoubtedly be one of the most enduring contributions
71. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
72. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not CorrectiveJustice, 91 Geo. L.J.
695 (2003).
73. Cf. Stephen R. Perry, On the Relations Between Distributive and Corrective
Justice, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
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to moral and political philosophy, we should ask whether the
normative concepts at the pinnacle of his theory-fairness, equality,
distributive justice-will really do all the work legal theorists of the
past few decades have asked of them. Rawls's own critique of
utilitarianism stemmed from a certain kind of candor and skepticism;
although he was extraordinarily able, as a philosopher, to retain large
domains of normativity within a utilitarian framework,7" and although
he took the improvement of human welfare and the avoidance of
suffering as enormously important from a normative point of view,
Rawls was eventually skeptical of the possibility of squeezing
everything into a utilitarian framework, and believed the distortive
effect of over-using the utilitarian framework counseled against doing
so. What arose, for him, was the challenge of taking seriously other
dimensions of normativity-particularly equality, fairness, and
distributive justice.
My own inclination, as I hope the counter-themes reveal, is that tort
law, in its broadest sense as the law governing "wrongs" and the legal
redress that the victims of those wrongs are entitled to, provides a
similar reason to move beyond Rawlsian themes in distributive
justice.7 5 We can learn much from Rawlsian ideas, from Rawlsian
critiques of utilitarianism, and from Rawlsian tools in policy analysis.
And a fundamentally Rawlsian conception of equality and liberty will
be essential, just as a healthy utilitarian concern for consequences and
for human welfare was important to Rawls. But the Rawlsian
philosophical virtue of openness to the substance of our first-order
normative domain should lead us to doubt whether a Rawlsian
conception of distributive justice will really tell us how to understand
the law of wrongs.

74. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955), reprinted
in John Rawls: Collected Papers 20 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
75. Cf John C.P. Goldberg, Reconstructing Liberalism: Rights and Wrongs, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 1928, 1855-56 (1999) (reviewing Ripstein, supra note 35) (expressing
skepticism about the capacity of Rawlsian liberalism to explain tort law).

